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Negotiating Statist Islam:  
Fatwa and State Policy in Singapore 
Afif Pasuni 
Abstract: This article examines how state-linked religious actors negoti-
ate religious demands in a secular authoritarian state. There is a prevalent 
assumption that such religious actors lack the agency to affect state deci-
sions. I do not seek to challenge that proposition, rather to qualify it by 
identifying the scope and extent of their authority. Taking the state as an 
autonomous actor, I examine fatwas or official religious edicts in Singa-
pore through the lens of ‘policy feedback’, which analyses how the bu-
reaucratisation of religious institution created new legal and bureaucratic 
channels that shape state policies. This paper aims to primarily answer 
the following question: What role do fatwas play in shaping statist inter-
pretation of religion? I answer this by looking at the historical develop-
ment of religious bureaucracy in Singapore – which includes the fatwa 
institution – and analysing the role of fatwas in relation to state policies. I 
argue that the bureaucratisation of religion not only regulates religious 
demands, but creates a juncture for religious institutions to inform and 
contest statist version of Islam though policy feedback, a concept that 
has thus far been only partially applied to economic issues. Policy feed-
back explains how religious demands are negotiated at the bureaucratic 
level and is particularly instructive in clarifying the discourse between the 
state and the fatwa institutions, which underlines that the policies and 
programmes of the autonomous state can be influenced by the very 
demands of religious bureaucrats. This paper also introduces Statist Is-
lam as an original concept with which to conceptualise the amalgamation 
of statist and religious interests, and considers how the informal authori-
ty of fatwas continues to function beyond the legal and bureaucratic re-
strictions set by the state. 
  Manuscript received 28 January 2018; accepted 13 April 2018 
Keywords: Singapore, Islam, fatwa, policy feedback, statist Islam 
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Introduction 
A fatwa is an expert opinion or religious ruling issued by a religious ex-
pert called a mufti. Fatwa represents a long-standing tradition in Muslim 
orthopraxy and orthodoxy that remains persistent throughout changes 
not only in time, but also in different political milieus (Masud, Messick, 
and Powers 1996; Skovgaard-Petersen 1997; Rahim 2006; Roff 1983).1 
As a form of religious instruction, fatwas2 are not merely restricted to 
religious rituals but also regulate normative Muslim behaviour in daily 
life. This covers privately observed rites, as well as a diverse range of 
issues such as social conduct, financial transactions and environmental 
and political concerns. There are fatwas addressing whether Muslims 
should join social gatherings that serve alcoholic drinks or open bank 
accounts that give out interest (interest is prohibited in Islam), or wheth-
er Bitcoin transactions are permitted. Fatwas also regulate how Muslims 
interact with the state and politics; there are many fatwas vital to state 
agenda, and some have gone so far as to support a country’s foreign 
policy (Haddad 1996). 
The primary function of a fatwa is to answer religious questions. The 
person who issues a fatwa, the mufti, is regarded as a religious scholar. The 
appointment of muftis is not necessarily a formal process. In a small town, 
for example, the religious leader of the local mosque may double as a 
mufti by default. There are also self-proclaimed fatwa institutions in large 
cities that have considerable Muslim populations,3 just as there are trans-
national fatwa bodies that endeavour to inform religious praxis across a 
wider scale of Muslim communities.4 As various muftis make their fatwas 
available online, fatwa-seekers can simply key in search terms to find 
instant answers to their religious queries. Due to the diverse range of 
fatwas available today, and easy access to them, a phenomenon known as 
‘fatwa-shopping’ emerges as questioners simply pick and choose fatwas 
                                                 
1  The author wishes to thank Kerstin Steiner and Dominik M. Müller for their 
insightful comments on this article, as well as the anonymous reviewer for 
his/her feedback. This paper is based on the author’s PhD research, made pos-
sible with support from the Islamic Council of Singapore (MUIS), which pro-
vided the necessary funding as well as access to key materials. 
2  For this paper, I will use the term fatwas to indicate the plural of fatwa. An 
alternative spelling often found is fatw. 
3  In the case of England, there are the London Fatwa Council, as well as Darul 
Iftaa (lit. Fatwa Office) in Birmingham and Leicester. Many individual muftis 
and religious institutions also run their own websites that provide fatwas online. 
4  A notable example here is the European Council for Fatwa and Research, 
which is based in Dublin. 
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that suit their needs (Hosen 2008; Zaman 2008). Fatwa-shopping is not 
only made possible by the ubiquity of fatwas but, more importantly, the 
voluntary, non-binding nature of fatwas, which places the onus of choice 
on the petitioner’s own proclivity. 
The vast variety of religious opinions and its popularity should not 
hinder another important dimension of muftis and fatwas: one that links 
them to the state or, more specifically, state resources. This is especially 
true in countries where muftis are sanctioned by the state, giving their 
positions legal recognition and bureaucratic access. Today, the appoint-
ment of a mufti is a typical practice for many Muslim-majority countries. 
Some countries have more than one mufti, each assigned to handle reli-
gious matters in a particular province. In countries such as Saudi Arabia 
and Syria, a grand mufti is appointed, in addition to the provincial muftis. 
Other countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, adopt a collective sys-
tem in which muftis representing various regions and groups meet regu-
larly to issue fatwas (Lindsey and Steiner 2012b). In Brunei and Singapore, 
the state appoints one mufti who leads a fatwa committee, which assists in 
deliberating fatwas (Müller 2015 and his article in this special issue; Lind-
sey and Steiner 2012a). Singapore, the focus of this article, is a Muslim-
minority country led by a secular government, yet the mufti and fatwa are 
legally recognised and bureaucratically embedded in the state (see also 
Steiner 2015 and her article in this special issue).  
For some observers, the appointment of muftis by the state, which 
was made possible by the bureaucratisation of religion, greatly curtails 
their independence (Hooker 2002; Steiner 2015). I seek to qualify this 
assumption by analysing the functions of state-sanctioned fatwas, specifi-
cally in Singapore where the fatwa institution is embedded in the state, 
both bureaucratically and legally. This macro-analysis allows me to exam-
ine the extent to which state control is pervasive, and what, if anything, 
fatwas do to mitigate this effect. 
The making of fatwa is an interesting topic because religion and reli-
gious institutions remain central to nation-building projects in post-
colonial states of Muslim-majority countries (Hefner 1997; Liow 2009; 
Nasr 2001; Al-Kandari and Dashti 2014). Yet, as some have argued, 
Islamisation projects through the bureaucratisation of Islamic institu-
tions are not simply a top-down process but might result in unintended 
consequences for the state as religious symbolisms and meanings get 
appropriated by social actors (Sloane-White 2017; Müller 2015, 2018). 
Fatwas are central to these projects because they can define or at least 
inform the authoritative normative position of Islamic religious practices 
for Muslims (Skovgaard-Petersen 1997; Masud, Messick, and Powers 
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1996; Kaptein 2004; Robet 2010; Müller 2015). In Indonesia, for exam-
ple, where fatwas have no legal standing, they have been shown to “con-
stitute an important form of dialogue” between the state and religious 
interests (Hooker 2003: 87), if not influence state policies (Menchik 2014; 
Hasyim 2015). As fatwas address a diverse range of issues related to eve-
ryday life – ranging from daily rituals to banking practices to political 
legitimacy – their relevance is not restricted to Muslim-majority countries, 
but even places where Muslims form the minority, such as Europe and 
North America (Zaman 2008; Bowen 2004; Bunt 2003). 
As a Muslim-minority country, Singapore provides a fascinating 
case study because the island was formerly part of the Johore Sultanate 
located in the south of Malaysia, and therefore shares similar historical 
background with it.5 The sultanate was led by a Muslim and, to some 
extent, observed Islamic law (Milner 1981; Milner 1988). In 1824, five 
years after the British arrived, Singapore was ceded to the British East 
India Company. Under colonial rule, secular law superseded Islamic law, 
although segments of it were exempted, specifically Islamic marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance laws (Lindsey and Steiner 2012a: 19). The popu-
lation of Singapore also changed over time, and the native Malays (who 
today are mostly Muslims) were outnumbered in the decades that fol-
lowed. In recent times, Singapore has been described as an intriguing 
case of “double minority”: Muslims are a minority in the country yet a 
majority in the immediate region, while non-Muslims are the majority in 
Singapore yet a minority in the region (Mauzy and Milne 2002: 100). 
Muslims make up roughly 15 per cent of the 5.6 million people in Singa-
pore (Census of Population 2010). With a history intertwined in Malay 
and Islamic influences, as well as an immediate vicinity to neighbouring 
Muslim-majority countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, the asser-
tion of secular politics is complicated by fluid religious demands (Steiner 
2011).  
Southeast Asian countries have a reputation for domesticating reli-
gion in nation-building projects. A great deal of the literature on South-
east Asian politics takes the authoritarian (or ‘pseudo-authoritarian’/ 
semi-democratic) state as its starting point, and discusses the state in 
largely secular terms whilst simultaneously downplaying the significance 
of religion to political institution building and the production of state 
legitimacy (Case 2004; Hamayotsu 2002; Hefner 2005; Rodan and 
                                                 
5  The Johore Sultanate reigned over the southern Malaysian state of Johor, which 
at that time included Singapore. In the constitutional monarchy of Malaysia to-
day, the sultan represents one of the nine traditional rulers who still retain some 
power over their respective states, especially in traditional and religious affairs.  
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Hughes 2014; Turner 2014). In Buddhist Thailand, the co-optation of 
the sangha is a key project that gave legitimacy to political elites (Hama-
yotsu 2008: 175). Similar observations were recorded in Myanmar and 
Cambodia (Keyes 1971; McCargo 2009; Schober 2011; Singh 2011). 
Meanwhile, in Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, the use of reli-
gion to garner political support is also not uncommon (Liow 2009; Noor 
2004; Singh 2011; Mohamad 2010b; Hooker 2003). Mobilising Islam and 
Buddhism in Southeast Asia was even compared to how secularism was 
invoked in the West for political gain (Hefner 1997; Hamayotsu 2008).6 
As such, the institutionalisation of religion is seen as a way for the 
state to manage and control religious demands. For the Muslim-majority 
countries of Southeast Asia, these co-optations are embodied in the 
religious bureaucracy, which includes shariah courts and fatwa institutions. 
A common theme is the instrumentalist narrative of religion that regards 
the state as the actor behind state-driven religious projects. Due to the 
proximity of fatwa institutions to the state, these institutions have been 
described not merely as “co-opted”, but “totally politicized” (Hooker 
2002).  
However, the bureaucratically – and legally – accorded religious in-
stitutions can also become a channel that affects change through ‘policy 
feedback’ by negotiating demands that consequently shape state deci-
sions (Skocpol 1992; Skocpol 2008). Conceptually, the institutions repre-
sent a product of “state-building” as “powerful bureaucratic constituen-
cies” emerge to “play a major political role in policy making” (Béland 
2010: 571). In other words, policy feedback accounts for the agency of 
other actors in affecting state decisions as policies are taken “not just as 
political outcomes, but also as factors that set political forces in motion 
and shape political agency” (Béland 2010: 571). 
Therefore, it is pertinent to note that the narrative of state control 
over religious institutions is increasingly being challenged by more tem-
pered analysis as some observers begin to identify the agency of religious 
actors in state-sanctioned religious projects (Mohamad 2010b; Abdullah 
2013; Peletz 2002; Lindsey and Steiner 2012a and 2012b; Müller 2015). 
For example, Mohamad (2010b) credited religious actors within the 
religious bureaucracy for state-sanctioned religious projects, which was 
made possible by their co-optation to legitimise political authority. This 
                                                 
6  There is a stream of thought, strongly influenced by Talal Asad, that categori-
cally opposes any such comparisons. He argued that religion as separate aspect 
of social life is a modern Western construct and therefore not a suitable con-
cept to describe Islam, or even premodern Christianity (Asad 1993; Anjum 
2007). 
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mediated the position of religious bureaucracy between the state and 
society, such as shariah courts, and have proved helpful in negotiating 
and compromising between contradictory societal and cultural discourses 
(Peletz 2002). Abdullah’s (2013: 1184) investigation of religious actors in 
Singapore’s religious bureaucracy posited that state cooptation is a com-
plex matter that does not necessarily depict a one-sided agreement, as the 
religious actors chose to engage the state with “larger end goals in mind” 
and “use their position vis-à-vis the state to their own advantage”. These 
discussions went beyond the assumption that argued for the extensive 
reach of the state in religious institutions, and the present paper builds 
on this. The state-religion contestation manifests in a unique projection 
of interests that I call Statist Islam, which depicts how state decisions are 
accentuated by religious demands. 
The remainder of this article is structured into four parts. The first 
part provides a brief theoretical overview of the paper. Part two will 
analyse colonial and post-colonial developments of religious bureaucracy 
in Singapore, including two key events – the 1880 Mohammedan Mar-
riage Ordinance and the 1966 Administration of Muslim Law Act (AM-
LA) – that formally established the state-linked fatwa institution. The 
third part looks at two case studies on how fatwas engaged with state 
policies. The final part concludes by assessing how the bureaucratisation 
of the fatwa institution allowed it to contest state depiction of religious 
praxis, and cemented the relevance of fatwas in state and society. 
1 Configuring Statist Islam 
A key factor behind statist intervention of religion in Southeast Asia is 
underpinned in the conception of the autonomous state. The concept of 
an autonomous state refers to the notion that the state should be taken 
beyond an arena of contestation, but as an autonomous actor in itself. 
Building on the Weberian notion that emphasises state centrality, 
Skocpol posited the state as an organisation “claiming control over terri-
tories and people which may formulate and pursue goals that are not 
simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or 
society” (Skocpol 1985: 9). Recognising the autonomy of political actors 
is especially pertinent in providing the proper context of authoritarian 
states. However, this concept can also accommodate the agency of other 
actors in affecting state decisions. In analysing state-societal relationship, 
Skocpol iterated that state decision-making formulation is independent 
of other, non-state interest. Beyond the direct patterns stemming from 
political arrangements, she also emphasised on the unintended conse-
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quences through ‘policy feedback’ (Skocpol 1992, 2008), which accord-
ing to Béland (2010: 570) can be defined as the “impact of previously 
enacted policies on future political behavior and policy choices”.  
To demonstrate this point, Skocpol’s Protecting Soldiers and Mothers 
(1992) borrowed from Tocqueville to depict how 19th-century American 
state structure affected the objectives and capacities of social groups, 
leading to policy feedbacks that consequently reshaped political process-
es, thus modifying the capacities of the state (Skocpol 1992). Peter Evans 
(1995) – a key collaborator of Skocpol – introduced the concept of “em-
bedded autonomy”, which explores the outcome of shared projects in 
economic development between state and societal actors. Migdal (2001) 
developed the “state in society” concept to demonstrate the mutual 
transformation of state and society. He saw the state as an organisation 
that is not only separated, but “elevated” from society (Migdal 2001: 17). 
This means not only that the state is a monolithic entity with a clear 
boundary, but also that, just like any other organisation, there are “ongo-
ing battles” that push “different versions of how people should behave” 
(Migdal 2001: 12). In sum, it is not only the state that matters, but also 
the subsequent consequences born out of its configurations and activities, 
which can “stimulate the development of influential bureaucratic con-
stituencies” (Béland 2010: 572). This, in turn, provides fertile ground for 
certain groups to form and make collective action and further their 
unique interests.  
I should note here that policies take many different forms; not only 
statements by the state, but also written laws, rules, and “the broader 
sweep of politics” (Birkland 2014: 10). Some observers have posited that 
policies can even “resemble political institutions, structuring social expe-
rience, organizing group competition, and channelling political participa-
tion” as “politics unfolds on an existing landscape where policies may 
already have fostered coalition, set agendas, defined incentives, given rise 
to interests, shaped popular understandings, and so on” (Hacker, Mettler, 
and Soss 2007: 15). However, the literature on policy feedback has been 
partial to examining the material incentives of economic and welfare 
programmes (Skocpol 1992; Soss 1999; Mettler and Soss 2004; Mettler 
2002; Campbell 2003; Béland 2010). Shifting the empirical focus to ana-
lyse religious policies effectively expands the scope to cover religious and 
cultural concerns and investigates the agency of state-linked religious 
actors in shaping state decisions. 
In Singapore, the establishment of a legal statute that accords reli-
gious bureaucracy reflects state policy in the rigorous management and 
regulation of religious affairs. The reach of this religious bureaucracy is 
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not limited to administrative issues, but also endows it with authority to 
issue religious decrees and justify religious actions. This, of course, refers 
to the fatwa institution, but it is situated at a unique juncture that strad-
dles between state bureaucracy and societal independence. The fatwa 
committee in Singapore is made up of both salaried religious bureaucrats 
and volunteer ulama (Lindsey and Steiner 2012a: 120–121).7 The commit-
tee also consists of other experts from non-religious backgrounds to help 
address legal, medical, banking, and other contemporary issues (Semait 
2015. pers. comm.). More notably, as I shall demonstrate later, despite 
officially working within the ambit of the state, the fatwas that are issued 
do not necessarily reflect the official state position; rather, they contra-
dict and even shape the outcome of state policies. 
The amalgamation of state and religious interests manifests in what 
I call Statist Islam. This refers to the outcome of negotiation on religious 
matters, mainly involving the state and state-aligned religious bureaucrats 
and, at times, other domestic and exogenous factors. Here, Statist Islam 
does not refer to a static form of religious narrative and praxis; it is con-
stantly in a process of changing and becoming. Yet, as is apparent from 
the prefix ‘Statist’, I argue that the state as the most powerful autono-
mous social institution plays the key role in shaping it due to its infinite 
resources and coercive power. This is exercised by placing legal bounda-
ries and bureaucratic restrictions, which then affect how religious prac-
tices should be observed. All these result in the state inadvertently pro-
moting a particular ‘brand’ of Islam. 
I must acknowledge that Statist Islam has been used to refer to reli-
gious projects that consciously manifest religion in the state (Mohamad 
2010a; Saravanamuttu 2010; Saenong 2015). Parallel examples in other 
Southeast Asian countries include “statist Buddhism”, which discusses 
the manifestation of Buddhism in the state, with emphasis on religious 
actors establishing linkages between Buddhism and the state (Cho 2013), 
or even meshing religion in the state apparatus to form a particular na-
tional identity (Lynch 2004). My interpretation of Statist Islam differs in 
that it does not refer to the immediate efforts to introduce religion in the 
state, or statist intervention of religion. Rather, Statist Islam is the conse-
quence of these efforts by the state, its apparatus, and various religious 
and societal actors; the product of preservation and assertion of each 
actor’s interests, and the sum of its consequences, both intended and 
otherwise. 
                                                 
7  Ulama is the plural of alim, which means religious scholar. 
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In examining common assumptions of subjugation of religious ac-
tors in authoritarian Southeast Asian states, the role of religious bureau-
crats tends to become marginalised in favour of a dominant state. This 
leads to the hypothesis, cited earlier, that downplays the agency of reli-
gious institutions. This assumption is especially problematic when analys-
ing the micro- and macro-level dynamics between state and religious 
institutions. Fatwa institutions provide useful insight on the negotiation 
between the state and the religious bureaucracy, which can moderate the 
position of both sides; this is not far from what Menchik (2014) argued 
in Indonesia’s experience. This builds upon the caveat that the “power of 
the state should not be seen as all-pervasive,” and moving beyond how 
“Islam has been subjected to a process of domestication by the state”, it 
is also “crucial” to examine how Muslims “have set limits to this process, 
either by resisting it, or by becoming part of it” (Kloos 2013: 20). It is 
the sum of these negotiations, not the immediate demands by these ac-
tors, that shapes Statist Islam.  
The conception of Statist Islam also resonates with what Sloane-
White calls “Corporate Islam”, which depicts how companies and busi-
nesses interpret state-sanctioned Islamisation projects. This also mimics 
Müller’s thesis on “hybrid pathways to orthodoxy” when he analysed 
how social actors interpret state-led Islamisation projects to fit their own 
narratives (Müller 2018). The difference here is that Statist Islam focuses 
on how the religious bureaucracy negotiates with the state to contest and 
affect statist religious projects, and how it exploits this close proximity to 
the state to both shape and circumvent statist characterisation of reli-
gious praxis. 
As such, although the religious bureaucracy in Singapore is an arm 
of the state, this does not necessarily mean that state demands are simply 
administered by the religious bureaucracy. Rather, state decision under-
goes an extra layer of filter that meshes it together with the interest of 
religious bureaucrats. I argue that there is a process that leads to the 
amalgamation of statist and religious interests, and leads to a particular 
form of religious practice building on limitations set by the state. 
Having explained the context that these religious actors operate in, 
the next part examines examples of how fatwas function within these 
limitations, and provides an explanation of what fatwas represent in con-
testing and informing ‘Statist Islam’. 
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2 Formalising fatwas: Developing Religious 
Bureaucracy 
2.1 Colonial Era 
The most significant occurrence in the development of religious bureau-
cracy in the colonial period was the Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance 
of 1880 because it rebooted the administration of Islamic law into a 
centralised religious authority, upon which today’s religious bureaucracy 
is built (Abbas 2012; Lindsey and Steiner 2012a). 
Prior to colonisation, Singapore was ruled by the Johor Sultanate. 
Various sultanates in the Malay Peninsula were known to have appointed 
Islamic religious bureaucrats as officials, advisors, muftis, and qadis8 (Ka-
mali 1997; Ismail 2015; Ibrahim 1996; Hussin 2016). Although Singapore 
initially remained under the Johor Sultanate when the British arrived in 
1819, by 1824 they were made to “cede, in full sovereignty and property, 
to the Honourable […] English East Indian Company, their heirs and 
successors for ever, the island of Singapore” (Newbold 1839: 490). Un-
der colonial rule, secular law superseded Islamic law, although segments 
of Islamic family law were exempted, specifically in marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance.9 As Stamford Raffles, who was credited with the British 
takeover of Singapore, noted: “In all cases regarding the ceremonies of 
religion and marriages and the rules of inheritance, the laws and custom 
of the Malays will be respected, where they shall not be in contrary to 
reason, justice or humanity” (Raffles, cited in Abbas 2012: 164). 
After the British took control of Singapore in perpetuity, things be-
gan to change for the Muslims in the country. As part of the Straits Set-
tlement, and later Crown Colony, the enforcement of Islamic law in 
Singapore was severely limited under British rule. Various landmark 
cases cemented the position of English Law as the default law, which 
meant that Islamic law could not be part of the law except through ordi-
nance (Yahaya 2015: 509–510). Therefore, Islamic law was “largely writ-
ten out as the legal basis for the Straits Settlements once and for all” 
(Yahaya 2015: 509).  
                                                 
8  Qadi, alternatively spelt kadi or kathi, originally means a judge that presides over 
an Islamic court. In Malay-speaking Southeast Asian context, the term is used 
today to refer to Islamic marriage solemnisers. 
9  Even then, historians noted that in the colonial period, Islamic law was relegat-
ed to the extent there were no proper Islamic court houses in most states and 
their staffs were neglected (Turnbull 1985: 22). 
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The dissociation of the state from the management of Islamic fami-
ly law pushed the responsibility wholly towards individual religious ac-
tors such as qadis and imams. The legal status of religious observances 
also became increasingly problematic in a state where both British and 
shariah laws were observed, leading to a “complex combination of judi-
cial precedent and statutory intervention” (Abbas 2012: 165), which 
Hooker labelled the “Anglo-Malay madhhab”10 (Hooker cited in Lindsey 
and Steiner 2012a). While these religious actors were left to administer 
Islamic law with minimal state intervention, this also meant that religious 
authority was dispersed. This led to disputes between various parties; the 
recognition of qadis was voluntary as each community selected its own 
qadi to administer Islamic law (Straits Times Overland Journal 1880). The 
issue was illustrated in an 1878 case when a qadi solemnised the wedding 
between a non-Arab man and an Arab woman without her guardian’s 
consent (Yahaya 2015). Her uncle asked the colonial court to have the 
marriage annulled as the marriage was contingent upon guardian consent 
according to the predominantly observed Shafi` madhhab, or school of 
thought. However, the judge dismissed the case as he consulted the 
manual of another madhhab that allows a woman to select her suitor 
without guardian consent (Yahaya 2015).  
This underlined the petition of Arab merchants for officially ap-
pointed qadis to ensure proper record-keeping, vital due to their frequent 
travels (Yahaya 2015: 503). This petition was eventually accepted by the 
British, and legislation for Islamic personal law was enacted with the 
Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance in 1880. The ordinance allowed the 
governor of Singapore to appoint official qadis and religious officials 
(Abbas 2012: 165) and established qadi courts with exclusive jurisdiction 
over Muslims (Black 2012: 10). This marked the rebooting of religious 
bureaucracy in Singapore and effectively placed these religious bureau-
crats on the same level as civil servants (Yahaya 2015: 512).  
This episode underlined how linking religious administration to 
state authority had a more complex dynamic, rather than a one-way stat-
ist usurpation of religious institutions. It also set the tone for the persis-
tent intersection of interests and demands between religious actors and 
the state. 
  
                                                 
10  A madhhab refers to a school of thought in Islamic law. 
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2.2  Post-colonial Era 
Between the 1880 Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance and Singapore’s 
independence in 1965, there had been gradual and incremental moves to 
facilitate the administration of Islamic law in the country. The initial 
Ordinance was amended in 1908 to make compulsory marriage and 
divorce registration, and imposed fines and imprisonment for offenders 
(Lindsey and Steiner 2012a). Another amendment, in 1923, saw the 
recognition of Muslim intestate law or faraidh in Singapore. The Muslim 
Endowment Board was established in 1906, followed by the Moham-
medan Advisory Board in 1915 to advise the colonial power on matters 
pertaining to Islamic affairs. In 1957, the Muslim Ordinance was intro-
duced, which led to the formation of the Syariah Court and later the 
Registrar of Muslim Marriages, formally institutionalising these organisa-
tions in managing Muslim marriages and divorces (Lindsey and Steiner 
2012a). 
When the Crown Colony was dissolved in 1963, Singapore became 
part of Malaysia but separated two years later. Singapore’s constitution, 
enacted in December 1965, entrenched the role of Islamic religious bu-
reaucracy in the state. During the short-lived merger, the Malaysian king 
became the highest Islamic authority, not only for Malaysia but for Sin-
gapore as well. Plans were in place to create an advisory body to advise 
the king; Singapore was obliged to establish a Council of Muslim Reli-
gion to advise the king on religious matters (Siddique 1986).  
The merger was short-lived, but the proposed Islamic council re-
mained apparent in the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA). 
Enacted in 1966, it superseded all previous Muslim ordinances and be-
came the all-encompassing Islamic legislation in Singapore. This eventu-
ally led to the creation of a centralised Islamic body known as Majlis 
Ugama Islam Singapura (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore or 
MUIS), the administrative body that today manages a slew of Muslim-
related affairs, such as properties endowed for religious cause or waqf, 
pilgrimage matters, madrasahs, and mosques. More pertinently, a fatwa 
body – termed Jawatankuasa Fatwa or Legal Committee – was also 
formed under MUIS. The establishment of a central fatwa issuer relegat-
ed the position of other fatwa-givers, gave fatwa official bureaucratic au-
thority, and marked the formalisation of fatwas in the country. 
This is significant because local fatwa-givers had previously lacked 
state affiliation, much less been tied to bureaucratic logic. As there was 
no single individual or institution formally appointed to issue fatwas, 
petitioners would refer to their respective religious instructors. Other 
informal avenues to source for fatwas were religious radio programmes, 
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religious books, and pamphlets (Syed Mohamed 1999). Due to the lack 
of a single fatwa body, the Muslim community was free to choose fatwas 
from abroad that suited their interests, thus stripping fatwas of their so-
phisticated, contextualised development. In these early variations of 
‘fatwa-shopping’, religious questions were directed to overseas muftis in 
nearby Johor, and even as far as Egypt (Syed Mohamed 1999; Yahaya 
2015: 499). 
Fatwas were also requested in national newspapers. For example, in 
1949, a petitioner wrote in to a newspaper asking the Muslim Missionary 
Society Singapore, better known as Jamiyah, a non-state body, for fatwa 
on whether imported meat in local supermarkets was halal or permissible 
for Muslim consumption (Anjor 1949). With the establishment of a 
central fatwa body, local religious petitioners were directed to a single 
official source to refer to, so much so that its authority eclipses that of 
other bodies. To illustrate, one of the early fatwas issued by the official 
fatwa committee decreed that a new Islamic lunar month is determined 
not solely by physical sighting of the new moon, but through astronomi-
cal calculations (Semait 2015. pers. comm.). Compared to physical moon 
sighting, which has to take place on the evening of a new lunar month, 
astronomical calculations can be done well in advance, particularly useful 
for scheduling and planning purposes for work and school. In 1980, a 
Jamiyah seminar discussed alternative methods of moon-sighting to 
determine the Islamic lunar calendar. However, this was criticised in 
newspaper forums by members of the public for challenging the official 
MUIS fatwa on the matter (Sulaiman 1980). This demonstrated the rise of 
the fatwa institution to supersede the authority of earlier, much older, 
religious institutions in the country. 
As technological, medical, and financial advances also led to more 
fatwa requests, the relevance of the official fatwa institution grew further. 
The fatwa committee in Singapore was initially made up of five members, 
and today consists of at least 15 members, some of whom have medical, 
financial and legal backgrounds in order to answer increasingly compli-
cated issues (Semait 2015. pers. comm.).11 A central fatwa body becomes 
an accessible point for religious queries and narrowed down religious 
authority to one body of religious experts. Fatwas are requested and an-
swered by mail, and can sometimes be publicised for public interest 
(Lindsey and Steiner 2012a: 122). Every time this body issues more of its 
                                                 
11  To date, there have been three official muftis in Singapore. The first was Mo-
hamed Sanusi Mahmood, who held the position from 1968 to 1972. He was 
succeeded by Syed Isa Mohamed Semait, who was mufti from 1972 to 2010, af-
ter which Mohamed Fatris Bakaram took over. 
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fatwas and opinions, its authority expands and pushes the other institu-
tions to the periphery. Over time, the fatwa institution entrenched its 
position in society and became the default reference point for religious 
issues. The creation of an official fatwa body clearly made significant 
changes to how fatwas function in state and society. It officially dimin-
ished the role of other fatwa-givers and relegated the status of fatwas is-
sued by other religious actors such as qadis, the ulama, and even religious 
authors. It must be noted that the existence of the fatwa body never pre-
vented these actors from issuing fatwas, although they must now contend 
with an official state-appointed mufti, in addition other fatwa-issuers.  
The fatwa institution is accorded new bureaucratic authority as it op-
erates through MUIS, enabling it to be linked to the state’s bureaucratic 
workings and thus allowing religious decrees relevant to the state’s deci-
sion-making process. This essentially establishes the legal-bureaucratic 
channel for religious actors to advance policy feedback and negotiate 
state decisions. While the fatwa institution is a constituent of the religious 
bureaucracy, it was established with the underlying aim of protecting 
“religious interest”.12 For the fatwa committee, this interest is exhibited in 
its core function, which is to provide the Muslim community with sound 
religious instruction directed by a group of ulama. The committee en-
dows the ulama with a much-needed platform to negotiate for their “sec-
toral” interest, which Pierret (2013) explained is “in the sense […] to 
influence state policies on issues that are seen as crucial from the point 
of view of a particular [religious] sectoral elite” such as “expansion of 
religious institutions”, “the preservation of orthodoxy”, and “public 
morality” (Pierret 2013: 164–165). Yet, the proximity of the ulama’s own 
position and their bureaucratic parent to the state should not be dis-
                                                 
12  Singapore’s constitution, enacted in December 1965, entrenched the role of 
Islamic religious bureaucracy in the state. Part XIII on General Provisions be-
gan with Article 152 on Minorities and Special Position of Malays. Article 152 
(2) of the constitution ensured the state’s role in promoting not only social, but 
also religious interest: 
 The Government shall exercise its functions in such manner as to recog-
nise the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of 
Singapore, and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government 
to protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educa-
tional, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay lan-
guage. 
 Immediately following this, Article 153 specifically provisioned: 
 The Legislature shall by law make provision for regulating Muslim religious 
affairs and for constituting a Council to advise the President in matters re-
lating to the Muslim religion. 
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counted. This is because this feedback channel is reciprocal and makes 
the fatwa committee more cognizant of bureaucratic considerations, 
which can also moderate fatwas. All these aspects would test the fatwa 
institution’s capacity to operate between the state’s bureaucratic logic 
and its own distinct religious function. The next part of this article looks 
at specific cases of this religio-bureaucratic contestation. 
3  Fatwa and State Policy 
3.1 Family Planning and Birth Control 
Singapore’s population control policy began with a staunchly anti-natalist 
one, and changed a few decades later to incentivising families with more 
children. From 1960 to 1987, as the state sought to limit the population 
growth, rigid and controversial policies were put in place to discourage 
births. Yet, as the policies persisted, fatwas continued to discourage birth 
control, and even stated that certain aspects of the policies were prohib-
ited in Islam (Kumpulan Fatwa 1987). 
The National Family Planning Campaign was launched in July 1972 
with the aim of reducing the birth rate in Singapore. There were several 
publicity projects for the campaign, including the telecast of a television 
discussion for the Malay-Muslim community, with panellists including 
the registrar of the Syariah Court (Merah 1972). In the forum, the regis-
trar stated that while family planning is allowed, permanent sterilisation 
is not permitted by Islamic teachings (Merah 1972). 
The fatwa committee discussed the birth control issue in August 
1972, a month after the National Family Planning Campaign was 
launched, but did not reach a conclusion. A fatwa was eventually issued in 
1974 in response to a letter sent in by a member of the public. The letter 
– discussed in a Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa or Fatwa Committee 
Meeting – was from a pregnant working mother of three who said her 
doctor advised her to undergo ligation after giving birth. Her husband 
disagreed because he was told by his religious teacher that ligation is 
prohibited for Muslims. She pointed out that refusing to undergo liga-
tion would lead to several penalties imposed by the state, such as paying 
extra accouchement fees, waiver of her maternity leave, and having her 
child’s registration in school deprioritised in favour of those from small-
er families (Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa 1974). 
This letter was written in the context of the state’s anti-natalist poli-
cies at the time, which introduced penalties for the families having more 
than two children (Wong and Yeoh 2003: 7). As evident in the above-
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mentioned letter, these included an increase in maternity fee and cancel-
lation of maternity leave. In the fatwa committee meeting, the members 
agreed that ligation is prohibited for Muslims, and that sterilisation is 
prohibited unless for life-threatening reasons or emergencies (Mesyuarat 
Jawatankuasa Fatwa 1974). However, I found no record that showed this 
fatwa on birth control was publicised; it was likely that the answer was 
only given to the questioner personally. For those looking for religious 
instruction on the matter, the lack of a public fatwa was made up for by 
advice from various ulama in newspapers as well as in private, all of 
which articulated the same line: no permanent ligation or sterilisation is 
permitted. This particular instruction by the ulama, as well as warning 
against making financial concerns the ultimate consideration, was em-
phasised in the media amidst the national birth control campaign (Berita 
Harian 1973a; Ismail 1974). 
In the 1980s the family planning programme was revised to pro-
mote larger families. At first, a slew of controversial measures were in-
troduced to encourage what can only be described as eugenics, which 
incentivised larger families only among the economically well-off (Yap 
2003). The most glaring one was the Graduate Mother’s Scheme, in 
which school registration was prioritised for children whose mothers 
held a recognised university degree or professional qualification. These 
‘highly educated’ mothers also received generous tax relief for having 
more children (Boey and Pereira 1984; Peng 1984). Meanwhile, women 
whom the state regarded as having ‘low’ educational qualification were 
discouraged from having children; instead, they were encouraged to 
undergo sterilisation in return for a monetary reward (The Straits Times 
1984a). For these ‘lower-educated’ women, undergoing sterilisation 
would also ensure their children received prioritised school registration 
(Peng 1984). Unsurprisingly, the selective scheme was criticised by many 
and proved so unpopular that it was scrapped just a year later (The Straits 
Times 1984b; Singapore Monitor 1985). 
  
  74 Afif Pasuni 
 
Figure 1. Various Family Planning Campaign Posters Produced between 
1974–1983  
 
Source:  National Archives of Singapore. 
Beginning in the 1980s, the MUIS fatwa committee publicised several 
fatwas on the family planning policy. In a 1984 fatwa, a familiar message 
was reiterated: family planning was allowed in order to “protect from 
physical weaknesses and encourage nurturing them to be strong and 
healthy,” and being sterilised to obtain monetary benefit was prohibited, 
“especially for fear of being unable to provide food or poverty” (Simon 
1984: 1). In 1987, a fatwa booklet published by MUIS also included a 
fatwa on family planning. The fatwa highlighted the traditional religious 
recommendation of marrying with the intent of having children, at the 
same time stressing that “Islam places importance on quality over quanti-
ty” (Kumpulan Fatwa 1987: 40). The fatwa also stated some conditions on 
using contraceptives; for example, it is allowed if it does not have per-
manent effect and does not cause bodily harm.  
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Although the state has since changed its policy to encourage a high-
er birth rate, some of these selective birth control policies remain.13 
What this episode shows is that despite fatwas bearing bureaucratic access 
and legal recognition, they do not necessarily have to be consulted by the 
policymakers. As such, their formalised authority was irrelevant in terms 
of affecting this particular state policy. However, this did not mean that 
issued fatwas were rendered totally ineffectual. During the decades that 
the state rolled out its anti-natalist population policy, the fatwa institution 
remained adamantly opposed to it. Because fatwas had limited recourse in 
changing the policy, rather than banking on formalised authority, they 
invoked informal authority to give religious instruction directly to the 
Muslim community. These fatwas directly challenged the state policy 
because they encouraged families to have more children. Clearly, the 
bureaucratisation of Islam does not mean the automatic religious support 
of state policies, as bureaucratic restriction could not completely restrict 
religious institutions from acting at their behest. 
In more recent times, due to the changing economic landscape that 
demands a larger workforce and more consumers, the state policy was 
revised to promote a larger population, including having larger families. 
As the fatwas remain unchanged, both the state and fatwa body now agree 
on encouraging births, at least until the next policy revision. 
3.2 Organ Donation 
Organ donation in Singapore was largely voluntary until the Human 
Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) was enacted in 1987. HOTA is a public 
organ donation system that assumes automatic consent from Singapore 
citizens. All healthy adults are included under the act and unless they opt 
out, upon death their organs will be donated to other patients. Initial 
fatwas prohibited any form of organ donation (Berita Harian 1973b). 
When HOTA was enacted in 1987, Muslims were excluded (Rahman 
2008; Zuber 2010) because although the fatwa had allowed organ dona-
tion by then, it still demanded explicit consent from the donor and two 
male guardians (Fatwa Pemindahan/Pendermaan Organ 1985). Over 
time, however, the fatwa gradually softened. Muslims were only included 
in the system in 2008 following a fatwa that allows assumed consent (Of-
fice of the Mufti 2007). 
                                                 
13  The Small Families Improvement Scheme was a state project launched in 1993 
that gave financial assistance to low-income families, subject to certain condi-
tions such as not having more than two children. It was rebranded to Home 
Ownership Plus Education (HOPE) in 2004. 
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The evolution of the organ donation fatwa took some 44 years. The 
first fatwa on organ donation was recorded in 1973, when a petitioner 
asked about the permissibility of organ transplant after death. The fatwa 
stated that it was prohibited for several reasons, citing among them the 
human body as temporal custodianship that should not be tampered 
with (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura n.d.: 42). 
The next mention of organ donation in the fatwa discussion came 
more than a decade later, in 1985, when the government – through a 
letter from the Ministry of Community Development – asked for a fatwa 
on the proposed organ donation programme later known as HOTA 
(Anonymous 2018. pers. comm.). The government was drawing a policy 
that would automatically assume all citizens to be voluntary organ do-
nors unless they opted out. There were discussions on the extent of 
severity that might allow for exceptions, but the fatwas concluded that 
organ donation, by default, is prohibited (Anonymous 2018. pers. 
comm.). 
Throughout the same year, the fatwa committee continued to delib-
erate on the permissibility of organ donation. There were also several 
discussions that the fatwa committee held together with other religious 
teachers in Singapore (Berita Harian 1985a, 1985b). By the end of the year, 
a fatwa was issued allowing organ donation in life-threatening cases, albeit 
with several conditions.14 If the donation is done after death, it is contin-
gent on prior permission of the donor and two male guardians.15  
Muslim parliamentarians also met with the fatwa committee and 
brought up comparative views on organ donation from other parts of 
the world, some of which did not require guardian consent (Anonymous 
2018. pers. comm.). Given that the position of the fatwa institution was 
already known, and the draft of the organ donation policy was coming to 
a close, it is not implausible to assume that the meeting was held to relax 
the stringent conditions stated in the fatwa. One might also say that this 
could be an attempt by the government to nudge the fatwa in a particular 
direction. The fatwa committee proposed that organ donation policy 
include an option for Muslims to be exempted. However, if a Muslim 
                                                 
14  The conditions that allowed for this circumvention are emphasised in it being a 
darurah, defined here as life-threatening emergency. Other stipulations were that 
donors cannot be coerced and that the transplant has a high probability of suc-
cess.  
15  The correct terminology in this context is wali, similar to the Malay term waris 
that the fatwa committee used in their discussions. It explicitly refers to male 
biological next-of-kin, though for the sake of brevity I have used male guardi-
ans instead.  
  Fatwa and State Policy in Singapore 77
 

 
chooses to be a donor then guardian consent is required beforehand 
(Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura n.d.: 42). 
In the deliberations that led to the decision, the initial fatwa that 
prohibited organ transplant outright changed; organ donation was now 
allowed but with stringent conditions. HOTA was eventually passed in 
Parliament on July 1987 allowing the automatic removal of organ after 
death by the state. The state enacted the ‘opt-out’ organ donation system 
in which donor consent was assumed from all eligible citizens, while 
those who did not give their consent had to actively opt out of it. Be-
cause the fatwa institution did not support assumed consent, Muslims 
were exempted except if they choose to opt in to HOTA. Section 5 in 
Part II of the Act reads:  
(2) No authority shall be given […] for the removal of the organ 
from the body of any deceased person – 
[…] (g) who is a Muslim. (Human Organ Transplant Act 1987: 
sec. 5) 
The fatwa restricted the inclusion of Muslims in the organ donation sys-
tem. As the years progressed, however, it became apparent that Muslims 
were under-represented among organ donors, and the number of Mus-
lim organ donation pledges remained low (Nirmala 1997). This low re-
sponse was exacerbated by the requirement for Muslim donors to have 
the endorsement of two male guardians. This created a unique problem: 
by the year 2000, more than 12,000 Muslim pledge cards were rejected 
because there was no proper endorsement from qualified guardians, 
meaning that Muslim donors could not pledge their organs despite their 
desire to do so (Bakaram 2009: 220).  
HOTA – which only covered kidney transplant – was amended 
again in 1998 and 2004 to include other human organs. In public consul-
tations prior to these amendments, there were already calls to automati-
cally include Muslims in the Act (Berita Harian 2003a, 2003b). Further-
more, other actors began to petition the fatwa committee to review its 
fatwa, especially the Muslim Kidney Action Association (MKAC), a vol-
unteer group that provides for the welfare of kidney patients. Together 
with the Ministry of Health, the group provided a number of reports 
over several years to justify Muslim inclusion in HOTA. The blanket 
exclusion of Muslims from HOTA had excluded them as recipients in 
the national organ donation system. The MKAC reports mainly ad-
dressed the health and social impact of the lack of Muslim donors, as 
well as data on the rising number of Muslim renal patients (Bakaram 
2009).  
  78 Afif Pasuni 
 
Amidst these developments, the fatwa committee amended the fatwa 
to expand the definition of a guardian whose consent was required to 
any two male witnesses, rather than just male next-of-kin. The fatwa 
amendment also permitted the inclusion of other parts of the body for 
transplant (Bakaram 2009: 227), but this did not bring about significant 
change as the procedure for Muslim organ donation still required pledg-
ing (Bakaram 2009: 217). 
Further petitions took place, and eventually in 2007 a new fatwa was 
issued that not only eliminated the need of witnesses or next-of-kin, but 
also presumed automatic consent from Muslims. This effectively meant 
that Muslims could be automatically included as donor and recipient in 
HOTA. To justify presumed consent, the fatwa stated that since pre-
sumed consent is revocable, it is deemed similar to normal consent (Of-
fice of the Mufti 2007). The fatwa also cited two key reasons for this 
change: the proportionately higher number Muslims with renal failure, 
and the low number of actual organ donors among Muslims. According 
to the fatwa, this underlined the dire need for organ donation in the 
country, which led to the amendment. Following the fatwa, Muslims were 
officially included in HOTA in 2008. 
This episode demonstrated how fatwas affected the organ donation 
system in Singapore. Despite the widely authoritarian and secular charac-
teristics of the state, the fatwa committee managed to affect what was 
supposed to be a straightforward implementation of a health policy. 
Because fatwas were petitioned in drawing up the policy, the state had to 
recognise its formalised authority, and even carve out policy exemption 
to not contradict the fatwa. This exception lasted until the fatwa commit-
tee eventually removed the requisite for explicit consent for Muslim 
organ donor, which then enabled Muslims to be included in HOTA. A 
significant part of this is due to the bureaucratic embeddedness that 
formalises the relationship between policymakers and fatwas. This al-
lowed fatwas to assert its own authority and facilitated negotiation 
through policy feedback, and simply by insisting on its position against 
an outright assumed consent for Muslims the policymakers were forced 
to accept the fatwa with clear implication on the policy itself. Thus, the 
embeddedness of fatwas in state bureaucracy does not always restrict its 
function or authority. Rather, as I have shown, because of this embed-
dedness fatwas were consulted in drawing up state policies; the reach of 
fatwas became amplified, and in this case translated into an actual na-
tionwide policy with obvious distinction for Muslims. 
Despite the initial adamant position of fatwas against organ donation 
– which some have blamed on the “problem of traditionalism” (Rahman 
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2008: 253) – there is a need to highlight that fatwas did change over time, 
and this today means that both the state and fatwa committee are in sup-
port of automatic organ donation. One factor for this is that despite 
adherence to traditional sources and reasonings which Islamic rulings are 
based on, fatwas are typically not immune from change depending on 
context, situation, and necessity. This is evident in the reason and justifi-
cation given in the eventual fatwas permitting the inclusion of Muslims in 
HOTA as mentioned above. Also, it is undeniable that without constant 
external pressure from the government and social groups such as the 
MKAC, such a change – which is already gradual – would be almost 
imperceptible. In other words, just like state policies, fatwas are also sus-
ceptible to change under certain circumstances. This factor adds nuance 
to the understanding of bureaucratisation of Islam, and indicate reciproc-
ity between religious actors and the government, and that neither one is 
insulated from the other. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has outlined the relevance of fatwas in the secular state of 
Singapore. I have traced the development of Islamic bureaucracy repre-
sented by MUIS and the establishment of the fatwa institution. From 
colonial petitions that demanded a centralised religious authority to pre-
vent mismanagement of religious affairs, to the consequent revisions of 
laws and ordinances to regulate religion, today’s religious bureaucracy is 
the result of more than a century of negotiations, accommodations, and 
political expediency.  
Indeed, fatwas have always been a feature of Muslim societies, and 
now more than ever, the deeply rooted, yet constantly evolving and con-
textually informed role of such institutions deserves more scrutiny. The 
fatwa institution in Singapore benefited from an overarching state espe-
cially in cementing its authority, and gave it new bureaucratic and legal 
access. Fatwas are placed in a favourable position to affect policy feed-
back on state decisions. This is a result of state policy that – in order to 
regulate religious affairs – had to create new bureaucratic positions for 
religious actors, consequently allowing them to organise collective action 
and further their unique interests. The religious bureaucracy formally 
establishes the intersection between state and religious demands. While 
the state arguably restricts the full potential of the religious bureaucracy, 
the latter can still affect the former’s decision-making process through 
this new legal-bureaucratic access. It is fair to say that, despite examples 
of aggressive implementation of state policy and the proximity of the 
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fatwa committee to the state, fatwas to some extent remain obstinately 
persistent.  
Thus, the bureaucratic authority of the state is not a complete sub-
jugation of all its institutions as the relationship relies on reciprocity, 
even if it is asymmetrical. The benefits of being closely positioned to 
each other are both enabling and restricting, and this bears true for both 
the state and the Islamic bureaucracy to which the fatwa committee be-
longs. Furthermore, the availability of platforms to disseminate fatwas, 
ranging from newspapers to its own publications to religious classes, also 
highlighted how state-linked religious actors can assert views autono-
mous of the state. 
These two case studies, which span a period of more than four dec-
ades, highlight the complicated relationship between fatwa and the state. 
There is no denying that the government – especially one with an au-
thoritarian reputation – ultimately holds the final say in many decisions 
involving religious affairs, but this needs to be qualified as its bureaucrat-
ic constituencies are also able to negotiate the outcome. In the popula-
tion control episode from the 1970s to the 1990s, state policy stemming 
from economic concerns led to the creation of an anti-natalist policy. 
Larger families were penalised, while those who adhered to the pro-
gramme were awarded with financial inducements. Despite its bureau-
cratic link to the state, the fatwa committee was unable to formally affect 
the policy. The inability to inform state decision through policy feedback 
was made up by other, more direct means: fatwas were issued to the Mus-
lim community to discourage them from participating in these pro-
grammes, and encouraged larger families by exploiting the various media 
platforms, as well as maintaining a consistent message among the reli-
gious teachers. The organ donation policy meanwhile shone light on the 
bureaucratic logic that binds both the fatwa committee and the state. 
When the state engaged fatwas, it was seemingly bound by them even 
though there were no legal basis for doing so. This allowed fatwas to 
affect policy direction. However, this bureaucratic engagement is not a 
one-way street, as fatwas also had to accommodate interjections from 
various state and societal actors, which ultimately led to the amendment 
of fatwas itself. 
The persistent negotiations and contestations between the govern-
ment and religious bureaucrats sometimes result in policy shifts and 
changes to reflect the demands of the involved parties. Both the auton-
omous state and fatwa committee possess means to circumvent each 
other in their decisions, and this perhaps cause both sides to be even 
more cautious, co-optive, and cooperative to the demands of the other. 
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This shapes the version of Statist Islam that, in Singapore, is built on a 
legacy of religious tradition, colonial rule, and post-colonial state dis-
course. In the midst of this complex dynamics, the modern fatwa institu-
tion represents an oddity in state bureaucracy; formally dependent on the 
state, yet autonomous enough to challenge it. 
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